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JOEL FRIED
HE U.S. government is involved heavily inpro-
viding credit assistance to the private sector. From
1971 to 1981, the total amount of federally assisted
credit outstanding jumped from $217 billion to $678
billion, an increase of over 200 percent.’ Moreover,
government direct and guaranteed loans constituted
almost 12.5percent ofthe totalhinds advanced, direct-
ly or indirectly, to the non-federal sector over the
period 1972—81. In 1980 and 1981, the proportion of
newfunds loaned to the non-federal sector in the form
of a government direct loan or guarantee rose to 17
percent.2
Thisarticle examines the consequences ofdirect and
guaranteed loan programs on interest rates and aggre-
gate demand. The analysis focuses on shifts in the
supply anddemand schedules foralternative sourcesof
credit affected by each type of pi-ogram. The results
indicate, under fairly standard assumptions, that an
increase in government direct loanprograms accompa-
nied by an equal decrease in government-guaranteed
loan programs will decrease loan rates to borrowers
who are ineligible for credit assistance. This shift in
loan assistance also will increase the rate of interest on
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‘See The Budget of the United States Government, 1983,Special
Analysis F, Federal Credit Programs (Washington, DC., 1982).
This credit assistance consists of direct government loans, loan
gnarantccs and loans by government—sponsored enterprises.
2
These data are calculated from Ibid.. table F—i, p. 6. It exclndes
neW equity financing.
government debt, and will increase the demand price
of capital and level of aggregate demand.
GOVERNME.NT LOAN PROGRAMS
ANI) PORTFOLIO CHOICE
There are two major mechanisms by which the gov-
ernment provides credit to private individuals through
capital markets: guaranteed loans and direct loans.3 In
the former, the government, having designated the
potential recipients, guarantees loans made to this
group by private financial intermediaries (hereafter
referred to as banks) against any default. In a competi-
tive banking environment, banks will pass on the eco-
nomic value of the guarantee to the borrower. As a
result, the borrower obtains the loan at a lower rate
than thehank would have chargedwithout the govern-
ment guarantee.4
In thecase ofdirect loans, a government agency acts
as an intermediary in place of banks; it issues loans
directly to the targeted group, obtaining the necessary
i’his does not exhaust the forms of government capital market
intervention, Other programs affecting capital nsarkets that have
come under the scrutiny of the Treasury its receost years include
lending by government—sponsored enterprises and tax exemptions
for interest income on some types of loans. These are not cots—
sidcrcd in this paper.
5
This subsidy need not he restricted totlse actuarially isir value of
the insurance. The government also could charge the banks afee
for the provision ofthe insurance Or could prox’ide a cashsubsidy in
addition to tlse guarantee if. fbr somereason. it wishedtheefl’ective
subsidy rate to he clilkrent froas the expected defitult rate,
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Table 1
Direct Loan Transactions of the Federal Government:
1982 Fiscal Year (millions of dollars)
Net Outlays Outstandings
On-Budget Agencies





Health programs 9 921
Housing and tJrbar Development 351 13.216
tnter,or 1 441
Transportation 86 1.003
Veterans Adminstratiun 228 3.368
L.oans tome District o! ~okjrnbia 17 1.684
Export-Impon Bank 763 16.565
Federal Deposit Insurance ~o’poralion 274 705
Foaorat Home L.oari Balk Board 86 758
Natonal Creoit Union Mm nstration .34 149
Srria!! Busness Administration 22 9.169
Tennessee Va
1
ey Aulnor:ty 69 267
Other agences and programs , 224 —. 1.091
Subtota. on-budget agencies 9 10? 100.220
Oft-Budget Federal Entities
Rural Etectrticatron ano leiephone Revoivino Fund .5 130 $ 9.7/4
Rural ~eleprioneBank 102 1 73
Federal F.nani iri9 Bark iFFB~ 14 ‘55 96519
US Ratway Associanor 42 123
Subtota’. off-bjccet
4
ederal en!it:es 14.345 107 588
TOTAL, net d:rect ioans 523.452 5207 808
SOURCE Ottice ofManagement aid B~oget-Spetn/ Analyses. Budget of the Unted.S’tates Govern.
inert Fiscal Yea, 7984 ti S Govnr.mert Prir.tnq O
t
Sce. 1983, Tahe F-6
funds from the capital markets by issuing Treasury
securities. Because government securities are used to
raise the funds, the interest cost will be lower than on
funds raised by private institutions. Ifthe government
intermediary passes on this reduction, the borrower
will obtain a subsidized rate of interest on his loan.5
‘The ssihsidy here refei’s to tlse difference between tlse rate of
intei’cst ahorrowerwould pa\’if tise luasswere nhtained frons a hank
and the sate he would payunder either tIme loan guarantee Ordirect
hsan prngra~ss s ofthe governsnemit, Timis ma\ not correspond to the
subsidy as viewed by tIme taxpayer; tlsat is, the eQst of tIme loan less
the i’atc of iisterest pmci on time bass, Rot gls estimates of the
ihsidies invol s’ed in thc’ various government loan assd guarantec’
programs are pi’esented iss Special Analysis F, Federal Credit
Programs, 1982. See, especially, tables F’— 11A and F—ilB.
Tables 1 and 2 present the various direct loan and
guarantee programs that existed inthe 1982 fiscal year.
As the tables show, virtually every sector of the econ-
omy is covered by some type of program, and assis-
tance to some sectors takes the form of both direct
loansand guaranteed loans. For instance, of the $9,943
million loans and guarantees outstanding in 1982 for
the Farmers Home Administration’s program for rural
development, $153 million was on-budget direct
loans, $3,387 million was ofihudget direct loans
through the Federal Finance Bank (FFB) and $6,403
millionwasprovided through govermnent guarantees.
Indeed, the FFB holdings of loans guaranteed by a
variety of on- and off-budget agencies provides an
especially convenient mechanism to convert loan
guarantees into direct loans. ‘[lie FFB simply pur-
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Table 2




















ffitlOnal ttMSAdrnjsflt~m 2 — S
tøti Vfley*tgSnw
ahecag~ann flr*ms __
Less Setondery atarstejed ioar$c
6NMAguaan$~s EN m8AjeS Oat _____
SbtOtSIS tkatn mt~ M 0 31 89
Less 9uatanteedtestishekIas rectittans
by budGetagency MA 4t611
byaWbud,qst tat t inflatik 4 ____
TOTAL, pray .gtwratsed tflaes $2U$S~
nsa,
Sranteesjbythe portlnipoa~ank thedebtatijiep rvateE portruianceGoiporatton
havenot*eenestinr*tt m .eiflidedtan the able
hen~uaranteedIoartSaracpteedbyabudgetacco in theybecome tSk*naattd e untedea
sud’tinlabia I theyat the Mote dethsctedtornthetot~jn this table
SOURO Oteot Managemrtsn aMBudgetSpiSlAnS* BudgetMItellmted
meat $ Yes ~84 ~ Government PnntmgOffice, 983) Table
chases the guaranteedloans that would otherwise have Gov ‘rnmcnt loansand guaranteesembrace avariety
been sold to private banks.6 ofprograms none ofwhich is of specific interesthere.
Thus, the subsequent analysis assumes that recipients
t
lt also should h noted that the distinction hctssein on budget
and off budget direct loans is ri_ails onl~in accounting distine- on budget drect loans the funds ‘ire aiboeated by the Tre i rs
tion. ‘set newdrc etloans i sued h, on budget agencies aretreated directly tothe sg ncs in the cas nf FFB directlc’nding the F 113
as partofthe budget. anincreaseofSi million in these loans hows draw on its line of credit at th’ lreasurs amid the Trea ury then
up as an incr is’ of3i million ia thehudget dcfleit. An increase of issu ‘s debt to pro’ id’ the FFB with the funds This accountin,,
the same amount inoff budget FF13direct loan. wouldsot sncrc’msc convention while pethaps important for congrcs ional control has
the deficit. Both willdo precmseisthe same thing tothe goserument no op ~rationii meaning for the ssne consid red here and
debt however namel~increase it hi, Si mullion. In the else of ignored.
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of government direct loans or guarantees are drawn
randomly from the general population. Our focus is on
the effect ofmoving a preselected group ofindividuals
fromone type ofprogram to the other, without regard
to the specific program itself.’
The principal difference between the government
direct loan and guarantee programs lies in the port-
folios that households and banks musthold as aresult of
these programs. For a given level oftotal government
credit provided, an increase in the number of direct
loans granted will increase the amount ofgovernment
securities that must be held by either banks or house-
holds. Therefore, ageneral model ofportfolio choice is
necessary to trace the effects of differential changes in
the two programs. In this article, the analysis is de-
rived from the implications ofaformal model based on
the work of James Tobin and detailed elsewhere.8
To present the model, the credit market is first
described for the case in which no government credit
programs exist; then the innpacts of introducing first a
guarantee program and then adirect loan program are
examined. Having examined the impact of each pro-
gram separately, the differential impact of the two
programs on interest ratesand aggregate demand can
then be assessed.
THE MARKET FOR THE
STOCK OF CREDIT
Suppose there are no government direct loan or
guarantee programs. The market for credit then is
characterized in figure 1. D0 describes the demand for
loans by the private sector and is afunction not onlyof
the loan rate, R9, hut also of rates ofreturn on capital
goods arid on government securities, An increase in
the loan rate decreases the quantity of credit de-
7
The choice of program amid recipient is, however, important in
considering the impact of increases in total federal credit assis-
tance. The answer tothe question ofwhether suchincreases would
increase the welfare of society hinges on whether the new assis-
tance decreased differences us the social amid private marginal
benefits ofcredit to the recipient. The assumption that recipients
are chosen randomly would he inappropriate for such an analysis.
Therefore, this question is not addressed in this arlicle.
t
See Joel Fried, “Government Direct Loans and Loan Guarantee
Ps’ogramns; A Formal Analysis,’’ Federal Reserve Batik ofSt. Louis
Working Paper #83-017, Octoher 1983. This analysismodifies the
framnework presented ha’ James Tohin, “A General Equilihriusn
Approach to Monetary i’lieory,” Jounmal of Money, Credit and
Banking (February 1969). pp. 15—29, to incorpos’ate the two types
ofgovernment credit assistance.
Figure 5
The Loan Market, Excluding Government Loan Programs
Loan rate
of interest
The credit supply curve ofbanks is described by the
upward sloping line 5o~By assumption, it is positively
sloped to reflect the increasing marginalcosts oflend-
ing. These costs consist of the operating costs of the
bank loan department and the cost of obtaining funds
to lend, eitherby attracting more deposits orby selling
government securities from the bank’s portfolio’0 An
increase inthe rateofreturn on any otherasset that the
bank could hold would shiftthe supply curve for credit
up, as would an increase in the rate of interest on
deposits. As drawnin figure 1, the equilibrium level of
credit is L0 and the equilibrium rateofinterest on it is
11,0.
°In principle, at least, increases in the rate ofreturnon anyasset will
increase the demand for credit as the household reshuffles its
entire porffolio totake advantage ofthis higher return, In practice,
it cast he expected that increases in R, will alter credit demand
more thasm would an equal increase is) 11. or R,m. l’his is because
households generally do not borrow topurchase assets that yield
pecuniary’ returns lower than the loan rate. tm0rhe analysis in Fried, Government Direct Loans (see equation
i—3) supposes that government securities, like ‘nones’, can he
viewed as a”producer’s good” that facilitates exchange activity.
See alsoJoel Fried and Peter Howitt, ‘‘The Effects ofInflation On
Real Interest Rates,” American Economic Review (December
1983). pp. 968—80, for a more detailed presentatiosm ofthis view.
manded; increases in rates of return on other assets
shift the demand curve out.°
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introducing a Government-Guaranteed
Loan Program
Now suppose the government institutes a govern-
ment guarantee program that is available only to a
portion of the population.1’ Figure 2 shows the conse-
quences of this program in the credit market. For
comparison, D0 and S~ are the same as in figure 1. D,
describes the demand for loanable funds by all poten-
tial borrowers who are not eligible for government-
guaranteed loans.
To establish the effects of the guarantee program,
some assumptions about the relationship between the
rateofinterest on loans that do not have a government
guarantee, 11,, and on those that do have the guaran-
tee, R~,must be made. We shall assume that the
government wants to provide preferred borrowers a
fixed subsidy rate, 5, per dollar of loan, and that the
banking system is sufficiently competitive that, at the
margin, the profit rates on guaranteed and non-
guaranteed loans are equalized.’2 Thus,
(1) Rgg = 119 — S.
Figure 2




Under this assumption, changes in S cause the total
demand for credit, as a function ofR~,to shift; as S is
increased, individuals eligible forgovernment-guaran-
teed loans would increase their demand for credit at
any given H,. Thus, for a positive subsidy rate, credit
demand would be greater than it otherwise would be
without the guarantee program. D2 in figure 2 de-
“As mentioned eadier, it is supposed that those eligible for the
government programs are chosen randomly from the population
atlarge. This assumption is not meant to deny one rationale often
given for government credit assistance programs, namely, that
these are set up to provide funds to high-risk individuals and
institutions. Rather, it is toclarift the exposition ofthe financing
effects ofthe direct loan and guarantee programs, which is our
primary concern, If this assumption is not made, then the loan
supply schedule ofbanks woulddependon how the favored group
was chosen, If the government could identify the high-risk bor-
rowers in the economy and provide them with guarantees or
direct loans, then the snmpply cun’e ofloans by banks to uninsured
borrowers. ceteris paribus, would most likely shift omst with the
establishment ofthe government programs.
‘
2
Suppose hanks initially’did not pass on these reducedcosts tothe
borrower. Then, D, svould continue to describe the totaldemand
forcredit. Each hank, however,would have anincentive to ofier a
lower rate to insured borrowers or give loans to thesn in prefer-
esteeto uninsured borrowers, Overtune, therefore, H,, would be
forced down relative to R
9
. l’he competitive banking industrs’
assumption says simply that, in equilihrium, relative rates are
such that any imsdividual hank will he indifibrent to offering the
next loan to either an insured or an ssninsured horrosver.
scribes this new demand curvefor totalcredit withthe
introductionofthe government guarantee program. At
R,~,there is now an excess demand for loans of the
amount L2 L0. This puts pressure on 11, to rise.
Furthermore, as banks issue more loans, they will sell
government securities. Therefore, the rate of interest
on these securities,
11
g’ increases. The increase in Hg
causes the credit supply curve to shift up, so that less
credit will be supplied at any given 11,. Finally, as
individuals take out additional loans, they increase
their demand for titles to capital goods, causing the
rateofreturn on these assets,
11
k’ to fall. This reduces,
in part, the demand for loans, but does not shift the
demand schedule hack to D0.’3
The new portfolio equilibrium will be at some new
loan rate, H,,, greater than 1190, andwill be character-
ized by a higher K, and lower 11k~Furthermore, ifthe
credit market is stable, the equilibrium rate of
interest on guaranteed loans, H, —5, will be less than
~it is also the case that, from general portfolio considerations, the
demand forcredit will shiftout as R, rises. For mtotationalconveni-
ence, these demand curve shiftshave heemi suppressed in figure 2.
11r1
L3 L~ L0L4 Credit
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H,~. ~A tthis new set of interest rates, there will be a
total supply ofcredit of the amount L4, consistingof L3
non-guaranteed loans and L4
— L3 government-
guaranteed loans. Loans to borrowers ineligible for
government-guaranteed loans of the amount L3
—
that would havebeen made atH,~ areno longer made.
The portfolio readjustment described above repre-
sents the initial response to the introduction of the
government guarantee program. Because relative
yields on financial instruments have been altered, the
stocks that households wish to hold will change. This,
in turn, will alter the allocation of flows over time. In
particular, because the demand price for capital has
increased (11k has fallen), there is an increase in the
demand for real capital, stimulating the production of
these goods and increasing aggregate demand in
general.’5
The increase inaggregate demand can take the form
of an increase in prices or real income. Suppose that
real income begins to increase first, transiently rising
above full-employment output. This increase gener-
ates increased savings to provide the real resources to
accommodate the real investment.
Figure 3




Overtime, however, the demands on real resources
begin to be reflected in increased prices. These in-
creases reduce real cash balances and real holdings of
government securities by more than they otherwise
would have been. In an attempt to maintain the real
holdings of these assets, banks would decrease their
supplies of credit, forcing loan rates up. The long-run
equilibrium would then be characterized by a decline
to full-employment real income, a higher price level
and lower real supplies of monetary base and govern-
ment interest-bearing debt. The distribution of loans





, — Sr’R90, then demand by insured
borrowers is less than L0
— L,, and demand by uninsured borrow’
ers is L3<L,, Thus, ifR~5
— S~R
10
,an increase in the planned
supply of loans causes a decrease in equilibrium loans supplied,
implying an unstable equilibrium. For the purposes ofthis paper,
we shall rule out unstable equilibria. See Mary Kay Plantes and
David Small, “Macroeconosnic Consequences ofFederal Credit
Activity,” in Conferences on the Economics of Federal Credit
Activity, Pan 11—Papers(Congressional Budget Office, 1981) and
comments onit by Ceorge von Furstenberg, in Conference onthe
Economics of Federal Credit Activity, Pan 1—Proceedings for a
mnore complex model that permits themmm.
miover time, the subsidy on the government-guaranteed loans must
also he paid. It is assumed here that lump-susn taxes are raisedto
pay for them, so that the subsidy itself represents a transfer from
the population at large to recipients of governsnent-guaranteed
loans and, as such, does not represent a change in aggregate
demand.
would be such that recipients of government-
guaranteed loans would have a greater command over
resources at the expense of borrowers ineligible for
guarantees andthepopulation at largewhopays forthe
subsidies in the program.
introducing a Government Direct
Loan P.rogram
Now consider the consequences ifthe government
initiates a direct loan program instead ofa loan guaran-
tee program. Tofacilitate thecomparison, suppose the
government again provides the same subsidy rate per
dollar ofloan, 5, so that the interest rate on govern-
ment direct loans, H,,~,is
(2) R,,~= .H~ — S.
Further, suppose the same individuals are eligible for
the govermnent direct loans as were eligible for the
loan guarantees. As figure 3 shows, under these
assumptions, D0, D, and D2 are the sameas in figure 2
except that thehorizontal distance between D, and D2
now describes the demandfor governmentdirect loans
instead of guaranteed loans. H,~and L0 describe the
bank loan rate and volume of credit before the intro-
duction of the direct loan program.
27FEDERAL RESERVE BANKOF ST. LOUIS DECEMBER 1983
To examine the forces at work when the direct loan
program is introduced, consider the demand and sup-
plyofcredit atH,0. First, there willbe anexcess supply
of loans that the banks wish to issue of the amount
—L,. This is because those customers who had
taken out bank loans before, now find that their eligi-
bility for direct government loans reduces their cost of
credit. Consequently, they no longer demand hank
loans atH,~.At 1190, however, banks would notwant to
alter their planned supply of credit; the decreased
demand and unchanged supply mean an excess supply.
Second, at 11~o~ the total demand for credit has in-
creased to L2 from L0. To finance this demand for
government direct loans, the government will issue
government securities. Thus, there is also an excess
supplyofgovernmentsecurities. This causes H,to rise,
shifting up the credit supply function ofbanks to, say,
While ~2 is drawn such that 119 rises in the new
portfolio equilibrium, this need not he the case. At
an increase in K4increases the opportunity costof
bank loans. This may or may not offset the cost de-
creases that accompany the reduction of the scale of
bank loan operations to L, from L0: if it does offset
these cost decreases, then 119 willrise; ifit does not, H,
will fall.
The impact on aggregate desnand is qualitatively the
same as occurs with an increase in guaranteed loans.
There is an increase in the demand price ofcapital (a
decrease in 11k), making it more profitable for firms to
invest. This puts pressure on output and prices to
increase. The increase in price, in turn, reduces real
wealth, causing output to fall to its full-employment
level. This causes loan rates to rise and the demand
price of capital to fall. The real quantity of monetary
base will be less than it was at the initial equilibrium.
A Gompensated Ghanze in
Government-Guaranteed and Direct Loans
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 describe the portfolio
effects of both the gimaranteed loan and direct loan
programs. With the exception of the loan rate on unin-
sured bank loans, these results are identical. The ques-
tion now to he addressed is: What are the conse-
quences on interest rates and aggregate demand ifthe
direct loan program is expanded and the guarantee
programreduced, sothat thereis no change in the total
ntimber ofindividuals eligible forthe governsnent sub-
sidized rate ofinterest? In other words, does it matter
whether a direct loan program is used insteadofa loan
Table a
The Portfolio> Effects of Changes in
Government Credit Programs on
Interest Rates and Aggregate Demand
ProgramChange
Increase in
Increase itt Increase in direct bans
gqvemrnent go~-emment anddecrease
Effect on guarantees direct loans in guarantees
tncI’aas~ uncertain decrease
increase incre e rmcrease
fl~ decrease decrease decrease
Aggregate
demand increase increase increase
guarantee program with the same borrowing rate and
the same eligibility requirements, and, if so, how?’6
To answer this question, suppose the government
currently has both programs in operation. Further,
suppose that the interest rate on direct government
loans is equal to the net of subsidy rate, H, —5, on
government-guaranteed loans. Thus,
(3) H, = Hg, + S = Rd + S
Thisensures that potential recipients ofeither govern-
ment program receive the same subsidized rate. The
analysis can be followed in figure 4, where Dc de-
scribes the demand function for non-insured bank
loans, D~is the demand for total bank loans (govern-
~Fheresults to this point cami he explained intssitivelyby mnaking aim
analogy tn government programs in the field of mnedical care. If
more individuals become insured under, say, the Medicare pro—
grani, the total demand br hospital care will imicrease. If hemie’
flciaries of the programn mnay use any private hospital, the cost of
hospital care at these institutions will rise, crowdimig out some
unimssurcd individuals, though not as mnany asthe incm’eased num-
ber ofinsssredpatients (orcosts svould not Isave increased). II. on
the other hand, insured patients can receive ssshsidized care omily
if they go to certain specified government hospitals, as required
say, by theVeterans Administration programs, demandat minn—\’A
hospitals ‘vill fall, causing hospital costs there either todecrease
(because ofthe lower utili-zation) or increase (becausethe rlemnamsd
for doctors will have increased causing their salaries to rise at all
hospitals). TheMedicare program is simnilar tothe loan gmmarantee
programn. TheVAprogram isanalogoustothe dim’ect loan prngrasn
Costs tothe patients are analogous to the loan rates to borm’owers
wishing to pmsrchase capital and the priceofdoctors’ sem’vices is an
anah g tothe interest rate ob govermmment securities. The qsiestion
now addressed in the text substituting directloans for guaran-
teed loans in the health care analogy is the following: What is
the effecton tlse cost ofmedical care if veterans’wives over age 65
‘vere added to the VA programn and ssot permitted to use the
Medicare programn
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fSgure 4
The Loan Market, ii Direct Loans Replace Guaranteed Loans
Louir rote
of interest
ment-guaranteed and non-guaranteed), and Di s the
total demand for credit nnder the pricing assnmption
made above. The initial equilibrium is at H0, with L
non-guaranteed loans, L — L government-guaran-
teed loans, and L — L; direct government loans.
Now suppose that the government changes its poli-
cies so that some individuals lose their eligibility for
government-guaranteed loans, but are noweligible for
government direct loans. This is described in figure 4
by a shift in the demand for total bank credit from D
to Dc. Suppose initially that the loan rate remained at
H;
0 and Hg remained at its initial level. There would
then be an excess supply of total bank loans of the
amount L—L4 and, because government direct
loans are financedby issuing government securities, an
excess supply of government secnrities of an eqnal
amount.
The former puts pressure on H, to fall and the latter
causes government security rates to rise until a new
portfolio equilibrium is established. If the system is
stable, then H; will fall, say, to R,, and Hg will rise
above its initial rate.1’ Because the total supply of
“An implication of this analysis is that an increase in the federal
budget need not, ceteris paribus, cause loan rates to rise nor
crowdout borrowing and investment by theprivate sector. This is
credit has increased, there will be an increase in the
demand price for capital and in the level of aggregate
demand18 Therefore, the analysis suggests that the
use of government direct loans increases aggregate
demand more than government guaranteed loans that
provided credit to the same individuals at the same
rate of interest.
As a consequence of the increase in aggregate de-
mand, either quantities or prices must rise to equili-
bratethe goods market. Ifprices rise, interest rates on
loansand on titles to capitaltend to rise as demands for
these instruments decline with the decrease in real
wealth. Because both investors and consumers face
decreases in wealth from the price rise, these groups
will reduce their (real) planned expenditures. It fur-
ther seems reasonable to suppose that personal con-
sumption will decrease, so that borrowers obtain an
increased command over the flow of real resources.
Thus, even with the price adjustment, the demand
priceofcapital is greater than it was before the change
in the program.
SI] vIMABY
This article has argued that government direct loan
programs are more stimulative than government
guarantee programs with identical amounts of credit
assistance. 19 The use of the direct loan program will
because direct loans by on-budget agencies are included in the
budget deficit. Such direct loans could increase through a com-
pensateddecrease ingovernment-guaranteed loans, in whichease
the analysis implies that private loan rates would fall. Even ass
uneompensated increase in direct loans by on-budget agencies




1n figure 4, the fall in It~ will, for a given 5, lower R.~ and H and
therefore increase the demand for direct and guaranteed loans.
This explains onlypart ofthe increased demand. The same qual-
itative results also hold when the total subsidy (L — L~)S,re-
mains fixed. (The ease ofthe fixed total subsidy is derived in Fried,
Government Direct Loans.) The rise in E~ causes individuals and
banks to conserve (Sn their cashbalances and excessreserves. This
permits a total expansion of credit as the yield on deposits is
increased, increasing total bank deposits. The sufficient condi-
tions for acompensated increase in government direct loans to be
expansionary are that the demand for capital goods be more re-
sponsive toloan rates thantogovernmentsecurity yields,andthat
the demand for the monetary base and deposits be more respon-
sive to government security rates than to loan rates.
‘9Critical to this resultaretheassumptions thatgovernmentsecuri-
ties and guaranteed loans are not perfect substitutes for one
another inbank portfolios, thatguaranteed loansare closersubsti-
tutes to non-guaranteed loans than are government securities,
thatthedemand for capital is moreresponsive toloan ratesthan to
governmentsecurity ratesand that demand for the monetarybase
responds more to government security rates thanto loan rates.
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generate lower loan rates to borrowers not receiving
government assistance, higher interest rates on gov-
ernment securities and a higher demand price for
capital.
These results can be seen intuitively by supposing
that, in increasing direct loans, the government arbi-
trarily exchanges $1 million of government securities
for $1 million of previously issued, government-
guaranteed loans in bank portfolios. Banks then find
themselves with an excess supply ofgovernment secu-
rities and too fewloans in their portfolios, which puts
pressure on governmentsecurity rates to rise and loan
rates to uninsured borrowers to fall. The lower loan
rates provide an incentive to households to purchase
more capital and other commodities with borrowed
funds so that either aggregate demand or the demand
price of capital increases, or both.
Additional implications are that government budget
deficits as currently measured may not accurately
reflect the government’s impact on the credit market
andprivate capitalexpenditures; also, because govern-
ment credit programs can change relative interest
rates, any specific interest rate may be misleading as an
indicator offinancial market conditions.